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ANTITRUST AND INNOVATION: WHERE WE ARE
AND WHERE WE SHOULD BE GOING
HERBERT HOVENKAMP*
The primary purpose of antitrust law is to promote competition. However,
both antitrust law and intellectual property law for large parts of their history
have worked so as to undermine innovation competition by protecting too
much. Antitrust policy often has reflected exaggerated fears of competitive
harm and responded by developing overly protective rules that shielded ineffi-
cient businesses from competition at the expense of consumers. By the same
token, the intellectual property laws have often undermined rather than pro-
moted innovation by granting intellectual property holders rights far beyond
what is necessary to create appropriate incentives to innovate. As a result,
these laws have often increased the costs of innovation in markets where inno-
vation requires building on the works of others.1
Perhaps the biggest intellectual change in recent decades is that we have
come to see patents less as a species of monopoly and more as a kind of
property.2 Overall this shift has been a good development because patents
rarely confer substantial market power. Further, their other attributes make
them behave more like simple property rights, with the attendant right to ex-
clude, than like monopoly. However, this makeover in conception also has
contributed to some less desirable expansions in the patent system. Signifi-
cantly, the “propertization” of patent law has not been attended by the devel-
opment of other requirements that apply to most types of property. One
principle of property law is that claimants have the obligation to articulate
clear boundaries of ownership, with the penalty for ambiguity often being loss
of title. Another principle is that property owners must communicate timely
and effective notice of their claims, because the cost of giving notice is typi-
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. I thank Christina Bohan-
nan and Erik Hovenkamp for their comments. This article originally was given as the keynote
speech at the Stanford/ABA Conference on Antitrust and Innovation (May 19–21, 2010).
1 See generally CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RE-
STRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION (forthcoming 2011).
2 Id.
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cally much lower than the cost of searching. As James Bessen and Michael
Meurer so carefully pointed out in Patent Failure, patent law remains an area
where we call it property without seriously requiring it to behave like prop-
erty.3 The amount of overprotection and wasted resources that results is
enormous.
For the most part, the patent system must confront these problems of over-
protection and excessive abstraction for itself, and antitrust has relatively little
place. For present purposes, I want to offer a few principles for antitrust anal-
ysis in innovation-intensive markets, particularly those claims that involve the
exercise of patent rights.
First, it is not the purpose of antitrust to fix defects in other regulatory
regimes, particularly when those regimes are federal. Antitrust law was de-
signed as a corrective for private markets. But where intellectual property law
leaves questions open, antitrust policy should feel free to seek the most com-
petitive outcomes as long as they do not frustrate the underlying regulatory
regime. Although one should not push the point too far, antitrust law, which is
judge-made, claims relatively more freedom from interest group capture than
does statutory intellectual property law. And if antitrust tribunals go too far,
Congress can be trusted to respond to the voices of intellectual property hold-
ers, who have consistently shown themselves to be a more effective interest
group than intellectual property users or consumers.4
Second, administrability is key. Neither antitrust nor intellectual property
law has any moral content. Their sole purpose is to make the economy bigger.
Antitrust law does this mainly by looking for and remedying output reducing
restraints as well as exclusionary practices by dominant firms that prevent
new competition from arising or developing. Intellectual property’s mandate
is also clear. It is to promote innovation—that is, the progress of science and
useful arts. Patent and copyright law satisfies this Constitutional purpose only
when the protections that they give increase ex ante incentives to innovate. At
the same time, government intervention is costly. As a result, intervention
under either antitrust or the intellectual property laws is justified only when
Congress or a tribunal has a defensible reason for thinking that intervention
will lead to more competition in the case of antitrust or more innovation in the
case of intellectual property law.
Third, not every apparent conflict between antitrust law and intellectual
property law is real. Many intellectual property practices, such as tying ar-
3 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46–72 (2008).
4 See Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567 (2006);
EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION
(2008) (proposing use of statutory default rules to limit special interest capture).
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rangements, may increase the returns to innovation or licensing without doing
any harm whatsoever to competition or consumer welfare.5 As a result, anti-
trust policy has no reason for intervening. Much of its historical, excessive
aversion to tying was really an aversion to patents. At the other extreme are
some cases, such as reverse payment pharmaceutical settlements, where the
competitive harm is serious and the gains to the patentee are often nothing
more than a windfall in excess of that which it could reasonably have antici-
pated when the innovation was undertaken.6 Approving such settlements does
nothing to further the incentive to innovate, while doing great harm to con-
sumers from reduced output and higher prices. In the middle are a few cases,
such as direct challenges to innovation itself, where true conflicts between
competition policy and innovation policy can emerge.7
Fourth, economic growth theory, which examines the sources of increased
productivity or wealth, remains controversial, and its different schools contin-
uously fault one another’s assumptions and methodologies.8 Nevertheless,
there seems to be broad consensus that the gains to be had from innovation are
larger than the gains from simple production and trading under constant tech-
nology. The strong version of this view suggests that, in cases where serious
tradeoffs are to be made between innovation and competitiveness, we give the
nod to innovation. Such a principle is important, for example, when we face
the claim that an innovation is an antitrust violation because the innovation
itself is exclusionary—a type of claim that antitrust wisely either rejects or
else limits to situations where the innovation at issue is no innovation at all,
but only an attempt to contrive incompatibility with the complementary prod-
ucts of rivals.
A clear lesson is that just as innovation promises greater growth than mar-
ket movements toward competition, so too can restraints on innovation do
more harm.9 In this area, intellectual property and antitrust pull in the same
direction. Both are served by condemning restraints that limit the likelihood or
range of innovations unreasonably. Of course, proof is a problem, but the
5 See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2010) (arguing that the majority of tying arrangements produce welfare
gains and net consumer benefits).
6 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ch. 3; C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Per se Illegality for Reverse Patent Settlements?,
61 ALA. L. REV. 575 (2010); Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Frame-
work for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37 (2009).
7 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE,
IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW ch. 7 (2d ed. 2010).
8 BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ch. 8.
9 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 (2007).
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antitrust case law contains ample evidence of both concerted and unilateral
exclusionary practices whose only reasonable purpose was to keep competi-
tors’ innovations from being developed or marketed.10 In these cases, antitrust
has an obligation to step in.
Fifth, innovation is not the same thing as patent or copyright law. Antitrust
tribunals should not presume that merely because something is lawful under
the intellectual property regime, it serves to incentivize innovation. At its best,
intellectual property law is based on a series of hunches about basic princi-
ples. It reflects consideration over what types of markets and innovations re-
quire protection, or, alternatively, when we would be better off to let more
market- centered approaches control, such as allowing first mover advantages
or secrecy. If we do create legal protections, we face considerable uncertainty
about their optimal duration and scope.
Further, the intellectual property law that we have hardly represents legisla-
tion “at its best.” Rather, these statutes are the product of a heavily interest
group-driven political process in which over time the interest groups repre-
senting rights holders have spoken much more powerfully than the interest
groups representing users.11 These issues will never be resolved with finality,
and there is no reason for believing that courts have some natural advantage
over legislators in identifying optimal rules. It does suggest, however, that
when practices seem quite clearly anticompetitive and the intellectual prop-
erty statutes do not speak to them with clarity, the nod should be given to
antitrust.
A good example is “reverse payment” settlements of intellectual property
disputes in the pharmaceutical industry. The Patent Act12 permits restricted
licenses to actual producers, and the restrictions may include territorial divi-
sions or customer or product divisions, which are typically termed “field of
use” restrictions.13 These restrictions are usually output increasing. By using
them, the patentee adds at least one producer to a portion of the market. For
example, the patentee of a sound system could produce and sell it to both
commercial and residential users itself or choose one or the other of these,
10 E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (dominant
producer of steel conduit manipulates standards organization so as to deny approval to plaintiff’s
innovative PVC conduit); Am. Soc’y Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982) (dominant manufacturing firms manipulate standard setting society so as to deny certifi-
cation of plaintiff’s innovative valve); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77–78
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft pressuring Intel to refrain from developing Java-enabled processor).
See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 9.
11 In patents, see Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187 (2000). In copyright, see Bohannan, supra note 4.
12 35 U.S.C. § 282.
13 35 U.S.C. § 261 (territorial restrictions); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304
U.S. 175 (1938) (customer division agreement via field-of-use restriction).
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refusing to license to others. Alternatively, however, it could license another
to make the systems for residential users, while retaining the commercial user
market.14 Such field-of-use licensing is a kind of production joint venture. The
licensor and licensee benefit themselves and society by the cost reductions
that result from use of a common technology.
In sharp contrast, a naked payment of money to a rival to abandon infringe-
ment litigation and not produce at all does nothing to increase output in any
market. There is no shared use of technology and no prospect of market ex-
pansion. Nothing in the Patent Act authorizes a patentee to pay a rival simply
to stay out of its market. Such practices themselves, if naked, are per se anti-
trust violations, and some of them are even criminal offenses. The courts that
have allowed such payments cite the presumption of patent validity and a
strong preference that intellectual property disputes be settled.15 Settlement
ends the cases without involving courts in all of the uncertainty that attends
litigation about validity or infringement.
We sometimes say that this preference applies to settlements of all kinds,
but that is not really the case. For example, suppose a gasoline station opera-
tor files a “trespass” action against a neighbor building a competing gasoline
station. The plaintiff in this case has no title whatsoever to the defendant’s
land. The parties then settle their dispute by an agreement under which the
station owner pays “exit payments” to the newcomer, who shuts down. No
court would think twice about examining the title record and seeing that this
entire lawsuit was a ham-handed sham to cover a naked market division
agreement.
The problem with exit payment settlements is not that they are settlements.
Rather, it is that the state of intellectual property titles is so poor that the
litigation has highly uncertain outcomes. Courts need to look less at the valid-
ity of the infringement action and more at the nature and size of the payment.
One way of getting at the problem would be to say that the payment of a large
sum defeats the presumption of validity and requires the patentee to establish
it in any challenge to the legality of the reverse payment itself. This rule
would not be inconsistent with the Patent Act’s statutory presumption of pat-
ent validity. It is merely an observation that a presumption holds true only so
long as no one comes forward with evidence rebutting it. The patentee’s pay-
ment of many millions of dollars to a generic drug maker to abandon its chal-
14 This general form of distribution was used in General Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 179–80
(licenses limited to either commercial or private fields).
15 E.g., Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 104–06 (2d Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
544 F.3d 1323, 1332–34 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056,
1065–68 (11th Cir. 2005).
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lenge reflects objective doubts that a patent was either valid or infringed under
the circumstances. With the presumption of validity thus removed, the court
could take a closer and more neutral look at the validity issue.
Sixth, antitrust is not the exclusive protector of competition in innovation
intensive markets. Many competition issues can be addressed more effectively
through the IP statutes themselves, either alone or in addition to prudent appli-
cation of the antitrust laws. One example is the law regarding refusal to li-
cense IP rights. The need arises most heavily in markets involving networking
or standard setting, where denial of access can have crippling consequences.
In part, the problem results from failures in IP policy. For example, to the
extent we continue to grant patents on fairly trivial inventions that other users
of the same technology are likely to discover on their own, holdup is a major
problem. Further, the patent system’s notice provisions are so deficient that
investors too often commit to networked architecture only to find out later that
they are infringing the rights of another.16
The problem with using antitrust to address such problems is that its
mandatory provisions for treble damages and attorney’s fees are much too
severe. This imbalance has led courts to compensate by creating overly re-
strictive substantive doctrine. Within the current regime, the best way to ad-
dress refusal to deal issues is often to look for solutions in both patent law’s
remedial system and antitrust. For example, antitrust together with intellectual
property is often a better vehicle for addressing such problems as “intercon-
nection” and lack of neutrality in networked communications. Regulatory so-
lutions have tended to go too far, requiring interconnection and sharing even
when doing so inefficiently diminishes investment incentives. By contrast, an-
titrust law has largely abandoned the area by developing a rule of virtual per
se legality for unilateral refusals to deal.17 Interconnection problems in net-
works cannot be properly addressed until we do two things. First, we must
define the appropriate scope of individual property rights, essentially a task of
intellectual property law. Second, we must define the circumstances under
which interconnection promotes competition, which is essentially a job for
antitrust.18
16 Cf. Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Concerted Refusals to License Intellectual
Property Rights, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 22 (2011) (examining dispute over a joint
venture patent license for an unused claim entered into to prevent the claim from blocking other
patents in the license), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Hovenkamp_Online_
Article.pdf.
17 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009); Verizon Commc’ns
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
18 These issues are explored in depth in BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, chs. 1, 3–4,
10.
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The same thing can be said of collaboration. Antitrust has moved from a
posture of hostility toward collaboration, condemning even efficiency-creat-
ing ventures with small market shares, to a position that is much more sensi-
tive to the innovation potential of joint research and production. Intellectual
property law needs to make a similar movement. But intellectual property law
is hampered by excessive propertization and holding out. The principal prob-
lem from the antitrust perspective is collusion; the principal problem from the
intellectual property perspective is exclusion, together with the costly
problems of innovating around, excessive damages, and double marginaliza-
tion that can result when effective schemes for sharing intellectual property
rights are not in place.
Seventh, intellectual property law can take some important lessons from the
road that antitrust has taken toward reform and redemption. Roughly forty
years ago antitrust pursued a course of protecting small competitors at con-
sumers’ expense and even condemning such practices precisely because they
reduced costs. Then, in the late 1970s, the Supreme Court dramatically shifted
the ground by developing the “antitrust injury” doctrine.19 The Court required
not only that injury be clearly proven but also that it be the right kind of
injury—that is, injury to competition and not merely injury to the plaintiff.
Further, this transformation was accomplished entirely by the Supreme Court,
largely in the face of congressional indifference and in apparent conflict with
a private injury statute that guarantees liberal recovery for every kind of in-
jury.20 The courts accomplished it without Congress. Intellectual property
should do much the same thing. An essential part of an infringement lawsuit
should be proof of actual injury-in-fact of a kind that diminishes the ex ante
incentive to innovate.21
To that end, intellectual property law would profit by continuously examin-
ing its root motivations as antitrust law does. Requirements like “antitrust
injury” force antitrust courts to ask in each case whether a practice really
injures competition or simply harms the plaintiff’s business. By the same to-
ken, courts evaluating intellectual property claims should consciously relate
those claims to the incentive to innovate.
This is an exciting time for those involved in the field of antitrust and intel-
lectual property, and a great deal of work remains to be done. As John May-
nard Keynes observed in the often-quoted conclusion of The General Theory,
19 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); see also 2A PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 335–337 (3d ed. 2007).
20 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (treble damages for “any person who shall be injured in his business or
property” by an antitrust violation).
21 See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm,
51 B.C. L. Rev. 905 (2010) (proposing a concept of IP injury that limits IP remedies to harms
relating to diminishing innovation incentives).
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where he faulted Karl Marx for thinking that vested economic interests inevi-
tably control all political processes:
[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly under-
stood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. . . . Madmen in authority, who
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scrib-
bler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. . . . [S]oon or
late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.22
As a scholar I have always found those to be provocative and uplifting words.
For those who are currently engaged in scholarship or hope to be in the future,
this time is particularly relevant for good research and writing in this field. In
few areas of law do the courts pay as much attention.
22 JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383
(1935).
